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What does emerge is the importance of elite behavior and choices during the initial regime change.
This article is available in Res Publica - Journal of Undergraduate Research: http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/respublica/vol18/iss1/8
RES PUBLICA  23 
IT’S MY PARTY SYSTEM AND I’LL INSTITUTIONALIZE IF I WANT TO: 
PARTY SYSTEM INSTITUTIONALIZATION IN YOUNG DEMOCRACIES 
Zoe Gross 
 
Abstrac t :  Scholars today mostly agree that party system institutionalization (PSI) is a key ingredient in the 
transition to a functioning democracy. The question of whether PSI matters is more or less resolved. What is less clear is 
a general theory of what can help new democracies reach a high level of PSI. The aim of this research is to discover the 
pre-conditions and elite choices that enhance the level of PSI in new democracies. This research uses two Most Different 
System designs to explore the results of ten hypotheses that test the relationship between the level of PSI and an array of 
independent variables in country cases across the globe. Analyses reveal that there is no single magic variable or even a 
single set of factors that reliably lead to PSI across cases. What does emerge is the importance of elite behavior and 
choices during the initial regime change.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 The transition to a functioning democracy can be a long and delicate process. The theoretical 
literature on democratization and democratic consolidation makes it clear that some factors matter 
more for strengthening new governments than others. Scholars today mostly agree that party system 
institutionalization (PSI) is a key ingredient in, and an indicator of, democratic consolidation. 
Although there is no universally agreed upon definition, PSI is generally believed to occur when a 
system becomes well established, trusted, predictable, and stable over a period of time. High PSI can 
help new democracies attain legitimacy and handle the surge of new voters entering the political 
realm.1 However, the time it takes for a party system to become institutionalized and how thoroughly 
the party system institutionalizes varies from one democratic transition to the next. Are there central 
pre-conditions necessary or choices that transitional elites can make to ensure timely and thorough 
PSI? It is the aim of this research to determine what matters most to enhance the level of PSI in a 
new democracy.  
 The level of party system institutionalization is an important enhancement to democratic 
growth, stability, and democratic consolidation. The existence of institutionalized party systems can 
provide stability between party competition, embed democracy in society, and produce political 
actors who are committed to the democratic system. On the other hand, states with weak PSI may 
experience increased uncertainty within elections for voters and elites, hamper citizen involvement, 
and lessen electoral accountability.2 The question of whether PSI matters is more or less resolved. 




 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Mainwaring 1999; Casal Bérota 2011; Mainwaring and Torcal 2005a; Wolinetz 2006 
2 Mainwaring and Torcal 2005a; Thames and Robbins 2007 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
While countless scholars agree that party system institutionalization is crucial to the process 
of democratic consolidation, there are competing viewpoints on the forces behind PSI. There is no 
widely agreed upon cause of PSI, but rather an array of possible factors and situations in which party 
systems will flourish.3 Most of these dynamics can be separated between two camps: preconditions 
and choices. Preconditions are established influences on PSI that cannot be changed easily, but rather 
are long-term system effects or forces. Choices refer to decisions made by key actors that can have 
an effect on the institutionalization. Figure 1 situates PSI in a pathway to democratic consolidation 
and traces a framework for organizing and understanding what drives PSI. In this model there are 
three broad categories of explanation: path dependent factors (modernization, transition, and 
history), socio-demographic factors, and institutional design. Some of these factors are clearly beyond 
the control of political actors. Political culture, level of socio-economic modernization, social 
cleavages, and history form the context which political actors inherit. Within that context, actors may 
choose the rules of the game. Different inherited pre-conditions and different choices may lead to 









 There are several inherited pre-conditions that may influence the success of 
institutionalization. Economic development is considered a crucial determinant of PSI in emerging 
democracies. Insufficient economic growth in a new democracy can hinder the success of the party 
in power. Economic hardship is in turn linked to electoral volatility and system instability, as parties 
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Figure 1: The Pathway to Democratic Consolidation 	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and the electorate hold incumbents responsible for the current economic distress.  An alternative 
vote choice is found either in an oppositional party or at the opposite side of the political spectrum.4  
 Evidence also that suggests that access to modern communications resources can help 
improve political competition in new democracies that have a history of single party dominance. 
Tkacheva (2009), for example, finds that Internet access is strongly correlated with votes won by the 
opposition party. Increased access can provide voters with the tools necessary to gather information 
about their political options. With greater party competition, real vote choice, and informed voters 
should come a more institutionalized party system. 
 There is also reason to believe that if a party system is established before the imposition of 
an authoritarian regime, there will be an increase in the stabilization of the re-democratized system. 
Remmer (1985) argues that the amount of PSI after a democratic transition coincides with the age of 
the party system before authoritarianism sets in, because the parties have had the opportunity to 
place roots in society prior to authoritarian control. Others suggest that the length of authoritarian 
rule has an effect on the continuity of the party system, thereby affecting its institutionalization, as 
previous political history can “set incentive parameters, which, in turn, affect institutional 
performance and levels of democracy.”5 Mainwaring and Zoco further argue that the electoral 
volatility within a party system diminishes over time, suggesting that the older a party system is, the 
more stable it will be. This phenomenon is credited to the increased amount of time that voters have 
to identify with parties, with the effect lessening after 30 years.6  
 Finally, the type of transition from pre-democratic rule to democracy can affect democratic 
consolidation and, by extension, PSI. Pacted transitions, where political elites allow for the creation 
of democracy in their state in a peaceful manner, provide much more stability than other forms of 
transition (e.g. government overthrow, tyrannicide). Pacts are beneficial because they help lay the 
foundation of democracy and erode the strength of the authoritarian regime, while at the same time 
creating a select group of elites to lead the country through transition and the early stages of 
democracy.7 The groups that sit down at a roundtable negotiation to end authoritarian rule may 
emerge as proto-parties, and later as established parties in the democracy that ensues. 
Sociological and Cultural Factors  
 Sociological factors also appear to influence party system institutionalization. Social 
cleavages, the division within a community into specific groups with political differences, are thought 
to be one of the biggest sociological influences on PSI. Cleavages can be divided into three types of 
groups: descriptive, attitudinal, and behavioral. They require social stratification, shared group 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Tavits 2005; Mainwaring and Zoco 2007; Casal Bérota 2011 
5 Malbrough 2008 
6 Mainwaring and Zoco 2007 
7 O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead 1986 
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interests, and group consciousness. Some argue that party systems institutionalize when voters 
develop party attachments based on religion, socioeconomic status, residence (urban/rural), and 
culture. These group attachments can lay the foundations of strong party identification and unity.8  
Traditionally, cleavages have been explained in terms of their number, type, and strength. In his 
recent work, Fernando Casal Bérota argues that none of those factors really matter for PSI, rather 
that weak PSI is correlated with ‘cross-cutting’ cleavages. These cleavages impede the ability of 
parties to find ideologically similar partners and create lower partisan attachments due to the different 
ideological pulls. On the other hand, when cleavages coincide with one another, parties and voters 
can be combined into two or more easily distinguished blocs.9   
Cleavages can also matter in a number of additional situations. Some believe that the early 
political mobilization of cleavages by elites will cause a higher level of institutionalization, but 
whether this applies across a wide range of countries is up for debate.  Others speculate that social 
class cleavages matter more during economic downturns, while racial cleavages have no effect on 
volatility or PSI. Additionally, the level of PSI is believed to be higher in societies with a higher 
percentage of unionized labor because unions serve as a sharply defined group to which members 
identify. Without the support of the organization in the workplace, workers are less likely to create 
partisan linkages.10  
 Other theories of cultural influence on PSI include personalistic voting. In most weakly 
institutionalized countries, voters make choices based less on ideology and more on the personality 
of the individual candidate. With weaker parties and party systems, there is less of an incentive for 
elites to seek the support of parties. When voters cannot rely on party identification as a cue, they 
will make choices based on the individual and personality. While this allows for more independent 
candidates to attain office, it limits the importance of parties and weakens parties as institutions.11 
Although they can make a huge impact, sociological, cultural, and historical factors are just part of 
the PSI puzzle. They may be crucial pre-conditions, but are there choices that can be made by elites 
to further PSI? 
Institutional Factors 
 Arguably, the primary scholarly explanation of PSI today is institutional design. Scholars 
agree that the institutional framework under which a party system develops can either promote or 
hinder development. Some believe that proportional representation systems, which are created to 
have the closest vote-to-seats-won ratio, strengthen the party system more than majoritarian systems 
do. Proportional representation systems reinforce parties, because party gatekeepers exclusively 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Tavits 2005; Mainwaring and Zoco 2007; Casal Bérota 2012 
9 Casal Bérota 2011; 2012 
10 Mainwaring and Zoco 2007; Casal Bérota 2012; Croissant and Völkel 2012 
11 Mainwaring 1999; Mainwaring and Torcal 2005b; Casal Bérota 2011 
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control candidate recruitment and parties have total control over who appears on their lists. Party 
systems with proportional representation strengthen both the voter and parties, and are more 
conducive for institutionalization.12 On the other hand, PR systems allow for a lower party threshold 
and thus a greater number of parties entering and exiting the system, while majoritarian systems tend 
to produce stable majorities and two-party dominance.  
Party fractionalization is an additional factor related to electoral system that some believe 
influences PSI. A high degree of fractionalization (or too many parties in a system) has been shown 
to prevent a multi-party system from functioning efficiently. With too many parties in the system, the 
ideological differences between the parties will be slim, making it easier to transfer a vote from one 
party to another. In countries where new election laws have decreased fractionalization, party system 
strength has increased.13  
Many scholars emphasize the effect that the “rules of the game” have on party system 
institutionalization. These rules are made for various reasons, but most signs point to a correlation 
between political elites who desire loose party rules and weak PSI. Either because of the nature of the 
rules or the lack of desire by the political elite for change, once electoral rules are in place they are 
rather difficult to change. The “rules of the game” that affect PSI include: plurality voting for the 
presidency, short-term limits for the presidency, and some types of plurality voting (SNTV, block 
voting, or adding additional party lists). In addition to electoral rules, some institutional rules also 
have an influence on PSI, including incentives for politicians to seek reelection, decentralization of 
candidate selection, and the protection of a politician’s autonomy.14  
The territorial distribution of power in a state can also have an effect on the 
institutionalization of party systems. Research has shown that partisan predictability and competition 
is affected when federalism decentralizes parties. The separation between federal, state, and local 
powers can have a negative impact on PSI that may be avoided in centralized states.15  
Additionally, scholars argue that the type of regime (parliamentary/ presidential) can 
influence broad coalitions and provide more power to blocs of voters. Some argue that because 
presidential candidates, unlike those running in parliamentary elections, cannot afford to ignore any 
segment of the population and must pull together a range of popular support, helping to increase the 
strength of a system and the level of PSI. Others argue that the personalization that is typical of 
presidential elections hurts PSI. The incentives to build party organizations and create ties between 
the candidates and voters are weaker, leading to increased volatility.16  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 (Croissant and Völkel 2012) 
13 Tavits 2005; Lane and Ersson 2007; Gwiazda 2009 
14 Mainwaring 1999 
15 Mainwaring 1999; Casal Bérota 2011 
16 Mainwaring, 1999; Casal Bérota 2011; Mainwaring and Zoco 2007; Croissant and Völkel 2012 
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 Combining such a wide variety of influences from path-dependent, sociological, cultural, and 
institutional factors and the nature of PSI causes a widespread theoretical speculation because one 
particular element does not stand out above the rest. Rather, PSI is a puzzle created by many factors, 
some inherited and some chosen, that influences the speed and extent to which party systems are 
able to institutionalize. Table 1 provides a list of hypotheses clustered according to the previous 
broad schools or approaches. 
 
Table 1: Hypotheses 
Path-Dependency: Socio-economic and Historical Factors 
H1: Greater economic growth and development lead to a more institutionalized party system. 
H2: The greater the access to information resources, such as the Internet, the higher the level of party system 
institutionalization. 
H3:  The longer a nation has been a democracy, the more institutionalized its party system. 
*H4: A pacted transition to democracy will lead to higher levels of party system institutionalization.  
 
Sociological & Cultural factors 
H5: The fewer the number of cross-cutting cleavages in society, the higher the level of party system 
institutionalization.   
H6: As the percentage of the workforce in unionized labor increases, the level of party system 
institutionalization increases.  
 
Institutional Factors 
H7: Higher levels of proportionality of the vote-to-seat translation in the electoral rules will lead to higher party 
system institutionalization 
H8: The lower the party system fragmentation, the higher the level of party system institutionalization. 
H9: Parliamentary forms of government are more likely than presidential to have a high level of party system 
institutionalization.  
H10: Federalism reduces party system institutionalization.  
 
*H4 is both a pre-condition and an elite choice. 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND MEASUREMENT 
Research Design 
This research is based on a small-N comparative cases design. The unit of analysis of this 
study is the country, and all data, when necessary, is aggregated up to the macro (country) level. 
Sixteen cases have been separated into two Most Different Systems Designs, based on their 
dependent variable score from the party system institutionalization index. 
 The purpose of using the Most Different Systems Design (MDSD) is to uncover the 
similarities between various countries that contribute to the observed political outcome. To maximize 
the benefits of this design, I divided cases into two separate groups of ‘high PSI’ and ‘low PSI’ based 
on my dependent variable index. I will compare the cases within each grouping to one another, in 
search of the independent variables they share. If my theories are correct, certain factors will be 
found to be common in the high PSI countries that are not found in those with low PSI. 
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Case Selection 
 When selecting cases for a Most Different Systems Design, it is important to select from a 
wide array of geographical areas, political histories, and cultures. A MDSD has the ability to reduce 
the number of variables by focusing on what has been hypothesized as explaining the dependent 
variable. Countries should be very different and share as few common features on the independent 
variable side as possible, because differences between cases cannot explain a similar outcome, in this 
case either very low PSI or very high PSI. All new democracies formed since 1978 were considered, 
yielding approximately 65 cases.18 From there, cases were eliminated on the basis of data availability 
and MDSD criteria. The final case selection includes: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, 
Taiwan, and Ukraine.  
 The selected cases provide the most control over the biases the MDSD seeks to avoid. They 
come from five continents across the globe and an from a wide span of political backgrounds. They 
have been established within the last 32 years, and fit under the classification of ‘new’ democracies. 
Dividing the countries into groups of high PSI and low PSI increases control over them even more, 
allowing comparison between states that have been successful at institutionalizing and those that 
have not. The selected high PSI cases are Brazil, Chile, Czech Republic, Hungary, the Philippines, 
South Korea, Spain and Taiwan. The low PSI cases include Argentina, Mexico, Peru, Poland, 
Romania, Slovenia, South Africa, and Ukraine. The current research on PSI is primarily on a case-by-
case or regional basis, limiting the widespread applicability of theories to all institutionalizing 
democracies. It is for these reasons that it is important to use cases from all over the world and form 
a variety of prior authoritarian regimes (right-wing, communist, personal dictatorship, party-state, et. 
cetera). This strategy improves generalizability and helps to test hypotheses and build theory. There 
are practical implications, too. If we can identify pathways to PSI, as social scientist we may be able 
to offer advice to regimes in transition from authoritarianism and to consolidated democracy.  
Measurement: Dependent Variable 
 The dominant literature on party system institutionalization focuses on the theory created by 
Scott Mainwaring and his colleagues, which include four separate dimensions of PSI: the stability of 
party competition, strong roots in society, the legitimacy of the party in the eyes of elites, and the 
independence of party leaders. Although Mainwaring argues that all are important to 
institutionalization, he disregards the other factors and uses the stability of interparty competition, 
measured by electoral volatility, as the only measurement of PSI.17  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Mainwaring 1999; Mainwaring & Torcal 2005(a); Mainwaring & Torcal 2005(b); Mainwaring & Zoco 2007; 
Thames & Robbins 2007; Malbrough 2008 
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 Instead of focusing solely on electoral volatility as the measure of PSI, this research utilizes a 
dependent variable index that has been adapted from Croissant & Völkel (2012). Table 2 lists the 
results of the five factors of the dependent variable index; electoral volatility, party identification, 
trust in political parties, corruption level, and voter turnout. By employing a wide range of indicators 
of the level of PSI, this approach provides the most thorough way to systematically measure 
institutionalization.18  













Argentina 24.9 19.45% 14.7% 3 74.43% 
Brazil 24.1 31.45% 21.73% 3.8 80.19% 
Chile 16.7 11.06% 29.79% 7.2 87.21% 
Czech 
Republic 25.7 37.1% 21.1% 4.4 62.55% 
Hungary 25.1 53.7% 29.9% 4.6 49.53% 
Mexico 22.7 28.5% 24.67% 3 47.83% 
Peru 46.6 31.3% 13.71% 3.4 83.71% 
Philippines 37.3 61.5% 71.2% 2.6 76.25% 
Poland 46.6 31.3% 21% 5.5 55.11% 
Romania 53 62.65% 15% 3.6 56.2% 
Slovenia 38.2 28.5% 16.8% 5.9 65.6% 
South Africa 26.5 60% 41% 4.1 77.3% 
South Korea 24.6 28% 23.9% 5.4 54.23% 
Spain 16.5 42.9% 26.5% 6.2 68.94% 
Taiwan 18.7 34.4% 17.4% 6.1 76.33% 
Ukraine 59.2 40.3% 16.8% 2.3 66.84% 
          % 
Median 25.4 32.93% 21.5% 4.25 68.89% 
Sources & measurement details: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Croissant & Völkel 2012 
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 1Electoral volatility scores for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Czech Republic, Hungary, Mexico, Peru, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, South Korea, 
Spain, Taiwan, and Ukraine from Mainwaring & Torcal, 2005. Scores for South Africa found at the website of the International 
Foundation for Electoral Systems. Scores for the Philippines are found in Allen Hicken’s paper on PSI in the Philippines. All scores are 
measured on a scale from 1-100, where 1 is the lowest and 100 is the highest. 
2Party identification scores are the percentage of the population that possesses some form of identification with a particular political party. 
They are measured on a scale from 1-100, where 1 is the lowest and 100 is the highest. Scores for Latin American countries (Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Peru) found in surveys conducted by the Latin America Public Opinion Project. Scores for South Africa from a 
survey conducted by the Afrobarometer in 2008. Data for Asian countries Taiwan (2006), South Korea (2003), and the Philippines (2005) 
found from the World Values Survey Values Survey Databank. Data for the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, and Spain from 
the European Social Survey (2010). Data for Romania is from the EU Eurobarometer (2012). 
3Trust in political parties comes from a variety of public opinion databanks. It is measured by the percentage of the population that trusts 
political parties as institutions. They are measured on a scale from 1-100, where 1 is the lowest and 100 is the highest. Scores for Latin 
American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Peru) found in surveys conducted by the Latin America Public Opinion Project. 
Scores for South Africa from a survey conducted by the Afrobarometer in 2008. Data for Asian countries Taiwan (2006), South Korea 
(2003), and the Philippines (2005) found from the World Values Survey Values Survey Databank. Data for the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Slovenia, and Spain from the European Social Survey (2010). Data for Romania from the EU Eurobarometer (2012). 
4Scores of corruption level from Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index.  
5Voter  turnout is measured by the percent of voter turnout in the most recent election from the International Foundation for Electoral 
Systems Election Guide.  
 
The first factor of the dependent variable index is electoral volatility. This is measured by the 
cumulative turnover from one party to the next, from one election to the next. This measures the 
stability of the party system and the pattern of competition between the parties. This traditional 
measurement of PSI is followed by the percentage of the population that self-identifies with a 
particular party the and percent that trust political parties as institutions, both of which are collected 
from public opinion survey data. Strong party identification is a measure of the strength of party 
roots in society, while trust in parties, along with low corruption levels and electoral volatility, are 
signs of the legitimacy of parties and elections.  
After collecting the data, the median was calculated for each individual factor and was used 
to divide the cases into ‘high’ and ‘low’ groupings. Then to create an overall index for diving 
countries into ‘high’ and ‘low’ PSI cases, cases were assigned a star for each factor that has been 
predicted as positive for PSI. Cases with one or two stars were considered ‘low,’ while three, four, 
and the five-star cases were classified as ‘high’ PSI.  The exception to this classification is South 
Africa, which received three stars but was placed into the ‘low’ PSI grouping because of extenuating 
circumstances in the government, culture, and party system. See Table 3 for a complete listing of the 
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turn out  
Argentina Low Low Low High High ««« 
Brazil Low Low High High High ««« 
Chile Low Low High Low High «««« 
Czech 
Republic High High Low Low High ««« 
Hungary Low High High Low Low «««« 
Mexico Low Low High High Low «« 
Peru High Low Low High High « 
Philippines High High High High High ««« 
Poland High Low Low Low Low « 
Romania High High Low High Low « 
Slovenia High Low Low Low Low « 
South Africa High High High High High ««« 
South Korea Low Low High Low Low ««« 
Spain Low High High Low High ««««« 
Taiwan Low High Low Low High «««« 
Ukraine High High Low High Low « 
       
Star 
assigned if: Low High High Low High  
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Table 4 lists the measurements for each of the ten hypotheses associated with this research.  
Table 4: Independent Variables 
Hypothesis Independent Variable 
H1: Economic Growth and development • GDP6 
• HDI Classification7 
H2: Access to Internet Connection • Percentage of individuals using the internet8 
H3: Age of Democracy • Years as a Democracy9 
H4: Type of Transition • Pacted Transition10 
H5: Cross-cutting Cleavages • Number of racial/religious cross-cutting 
cleavages in a society11 
H6: Unionized Workforce • Percentage of population in unions12 
H7: Proportionality of Electoral Rules • Gallagher’s Index (least squares index)13 
H8: Number of Political Parties • Effective number of parties at the electoral 
level14 
H9: Parliamentary Forms of Government • Form of government 
(Parliamentary/Presidential)15 
H10: Division of Power  • Federal of Unitary government16 
Sources: 
6Gross Domestic Product, per capita: From the CIA World Fact Book. Measured in US dollars. 
7Human Development Index Classification 2011: From the UN Development Report. Classified as “very high,” “high,” “medium,” or 
“low.” 
8Percentage of individuals using the Internet: from the International Telecommunications Union. Also available from Google Data 
explorer.  
9Years as a democracy: From the CIA World Fact Book.  
10Pacted transition: Most taken from the model created Carsten Schneider’s book on The Consolidation of Democracy. 
11From the Cross-national Indices of Multi-dimensional Measures of Social Structure (CIMMSS).  
12Unionized workforce: percentage of population who identify as belonging to a labor union. All countries excluding Taiwan found 
through the World Values Survey Values Survey Databank. Taiwan gathered from the Encyclopedia of the Nations.  
13Gallagher Index: From Gallagher and Mitchell’s The Politics of Electoral Systems.  
14Effective number of parties: From Gallagher and Mitchell’s The Politics of Electoral Systems. (Scores for the Phillippines found in the 
Bertelsmann Transformation Index). 
15Parliamentary/presidential form of government: From the CIA World Factbook 
16Federalism: From the Forum of Federations 
 
The data for such a wide collection of variables comes from a combination of many sources. 
This is a strength, because it gathers from different forms of measurements and minimalize the 
biases that could come from a single source. All sources are reliable, but not complete for all of the 
countries in the case selection. Because of the missing data, a combination of multiple sources was 
used to fulfill the independent measures for each case. There are several different ways to measure 
the different independent variables listed above, but the chosen measures are the most consistent, 
reliable, and widely available for the most cases as possible.  
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ANALYSIS 
 In a Most Different Systems Design, cases are first analyzed in groupings that share 
dependent variables. In this case, countries were separated into the “high” and “low” PSI categories 
and then explored for possible trends. Table 5 and Table 6, below, show the data for all 11 
independent variables. 
 










 Brazil Chile Czech Republic Hungary Philippines South Korea Spain Taiwan 
Path Dependent Factors        
GDP $11,900.00 $17,400 $27,400 $19,800 $4,100 $32,100 $31,000 $38,200 
HDI Classification High Very High Very High Very High Medium Very High Very High Very High 
Percent of 
Individuals who use 
the Internet 
45% 54% 73% 59% 29% 84% 68% 72% 
Years as a 
democracy 27 22 23 22 26 19 34 12 
Pacted transition No Yes No Yes No No Yes Yes 
Sociological & Cultural Factors       
Number of cross-
cutting cleavages 0.944 0.852 0.931* 0.931 0.916 0.543 0.64 0.543* 
Percent of 
workforce in unions 6.40% 4.60% 17.60% 19.30% 4% 9.60% 4.20% 29.00% 
Institutional Factors        
Gallagher Index 2.5 6.87 8.76 11.67 7.59 7.15 6.93 16.89 
Effective number of 
parties 8.94 7.32 6.75 2.82 3.50 3.02 3.34 2.4 
Form of 
government Presidential Presidential Parliamentary Parliamentary Presidential Semi-Presidential Parliamentary Presidential 
Division of power Federalist Unitary Unitary Unitary Unitary Unitary Federalist Unitary 
DV High High High High High High High High 
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 A review of the tables more effectively explains which theories and independent variables are 
not related to PSI than pointing out strong causes. Table 5 shows that there are almost no path 
dependent factors that make a difference in the PSI of the cases studied, and the same can be found 
in the Low PSI cases, shown by Table 6. There are a wide range of GDP values for both groupings, 
with both significantly higher values in the low PSI group and lower values in the high PSI group. 
HDI classification and the percent of individuals who use the Internet can also be eliminated for 
both the high and low PSI cases as well. Because they are fairly modernized societies, all of the cases 
fall within the “medium” to “very high” HDI classification, with most scoring “high” or “very high.” 
Although Table 5 shows that the high PSI cases tend to have higher percentages of individuals who 
  Argentina  Mexico  Peru  Poland  Romania  Slovenia  
South 
Africa  Ukraine  
Path Dependent Factors                       
GDP  $17,700  $14,800  $10,200  $20,600  $12,600  $29,00  $11,100  $7,300  
HDI Classification  Very High  High  High  Very High  High  Very High  Medium  High  
Percent of Individuals 
who use the Internet  48% 36% 37% 65% 44% 72% 21% 31% 
Years as a democracy  29 12 32 23 23  21 18 21 
Pacted transition 
No No No Yes No No Yes No 
Sociological & Cultural Factors       
Number of cross-cutting 
cleavages  0.944 0.903 0.923 0.931*  
 
0.906* 
   
0.931*  0.543 0.5 
Percent of workforce in 
unions  2% 4.80% 4.50% 15.90% 14.30% 18.10% 6.50% 20.60% 
Institutional Factors                       
Gallagher 
4.99 10.46 8.87 5.95 3.32 3.64 0.3 3.59 
 Index  
Effective number of 
parties  8.94 3.77 5.71 3.74 3.93 5.57 2.13 3.85 
Form of government  Presidential  Presidential  Presidential  Parliamentary  Semi- Presidential  Parliamentary  Presidential  
Semi-
Presidential  
Division of power  Federalist Federalist  Unitary  Unitary  Unitary  Unitary  Federalist  Unitary  
Dependent Variable Low  Low  Low  Low  Low  Low  Low  Low  
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use the Internet, there is great variance and even some cases where Internet usage is very low. The 
same occurs with the low PSI cases, with percentages ranging from 21% to 72%. Nor does the 
number of years as an established democracy affect either the high or low PSI cases. This comes as 
no surprise, as the variation between the cases is very slim due to their shared status as “new 
democracies.”  
 Neither of the independent variables associated with the sociological or cultural factors 
appear to have an effect on the level of PSI in either the high or low cases. It is hypothesized that as 
the number of cross-cutting cleavages increases (or as the score gets closer to 1), the PSI will 
decrease. Although a few of the high PSI cases have lower levels of cross-cutting cleavages, most are 
high and relatively similar to the low PSI cases. There is not a significant relationship between these 
variables. The percent of the workforce associated with unions also does little as an explanation of 
the level of PSI. Both the high and low designs show no clear relationship between an increase in a 
unionized workforce and an increase in PSI.  
 Generally, institutional factors also seem to make little difference in the level of PSI. 
Contrary to the hypothesis, parliamentary forms of government do not dominate the high PSI cases, 
but rather, more cases have presidential systems. There are also more presidential forms of 
government in the low PSI cases, but a fair number of parliamentary systems exist, eliminating this as 
an explanation for the low PSI cases as well.  
The division of power within a government, whether federalist or unitary, can also be 
eliminated as having an effect on both the high and low PSI cases. There are federalist and highly 
devolved unitary states that have very high levels of PSI (Brazil and Spain), and many low PSI cases 
with unitary governments. This goes against the predicted hypothesis.  
Like other institutional factors, the effective number of parties also appears to have little 
significance for the high or low PSI cases. The number of effective parties is all over the board for 
both MSSD tables, and may be attributed to the type of electoral system in each given country. In the 
end, it does not appear to be a cause of the PSI in the selected cases.  
 High PSI cases are predicted to have lower scores on the Gallagher Index, but this study 
seems to show just the opposite.  A score of zero on the Gallagher Index indicates an election where 
the seats won to vote share is perfectly proportional, and 100 would indicate perfect 
disproportionality. Only Brazil has a fairly low score (2.5), with others reaching a score greater than 
10. The low PSI cases, on the other hand, perform better overall on the Gallagher Index, with most 
cases at or near a score of 5. These results do not help predict why some systems are more 
institutionalized and can be eliminated as a cause.19 
 The most promising relationship in both the high and the low PSI cases is the last path 
dependent variable. The presence of a pacted transition at the time of democratic transition, although 
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not perfect, seems to have some relationship with the level of PSI. Table 6 shows that pacted 
transitions were found in four of the eight cases. This on its own would hardly be enough to warrant 
a relationship, but Table 6 shows that only two of the low PSI cases had pacted transitions. This data 
shows that a pacted transition may have a significant effect on the future level of institutionalization 
and deserves further consideration.  
The Significance of Pacted Transitions 
 It appears as if the only potential explanation of the level of PSI in these cases come from 
the presence of a pacted transition at the time of democratic transition. To further test this 
relationship, all sixteen cases were brought back together into a single dataset, and a single-tailed 
bivariate correlation was found between the level of party system institutionalization and presence of 
a pacted transition. The results are shown in Table 7.  
 
Table 7: Pearson Correlation of Pacted Transitions 
  Pacted Transition 








  **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed) 
  
The table above shows that there is a strong, statistically significant relationship between the 
level of PSI and the presence of a pacted transition. The relationship is in the predicted direction 
(‘pacted’ transition is coded as 1 in the data set, and ‘not pacted’ is a zero). As the level of party 
system institutionalization increases, the prevalence of pacted transitions also increases. Figure 2 
shows the relationship between the independent and dependent variable in the form of a bar graph. 
Although the relationship is not perfect, a positive relationship is clear. 
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Hypothesis 4 in this research appears to be correct and suggests that the way the transition 
to democracy is carried out and the elites that emerge to lead the new government can make a 
difference in the level of PSI. Stable and peaceful transitions will help perpetuate stable party systems 
in the future. The successes of the party system may be dependent on the circumstances of transition 
and could actually have little to do with the decisions made by elites thereafter. 
For example, the transitions of one-star Romania and five-star Spain show the impact a 
peaceful, pacted transition can have on the immediate and long-term success of democracy. The 
Romanian transition included violent demonstrations and a coup that ended with the execution of 
Communist leader Nicolae Ceaucescu.19 Spain, on the other hand, featured almost every type of pact, 
including the elite-driven Pacte de la Moncloa of 1977.20 There is no doubt that this peaceful transition 
had an impact on Spain’s immediate success as a democracy. It is understood that "pacts are not 
always likely or possible, but we are convinced that where they are a feature of the transition, they are 
desirable—that is, they enhance the probability that the process will lead to a viable political 
democracy".21 
CONCLUSION 
 Almost all of the hypotheses derived from the existing literature on the causes of party 
system institutionalization have been rejected in this study. Some of them, such as the institutional 
framework and rules chosen by elites, come as quite a surprise, while the finding of others were more 
expected. These findings suggests a disparity between the cases and the literature, or in the data 
gathered for each variable. Although only one independent variable, the use of pacted transitions, has 
been shown to have an effect on the level of PSI, many other common theories appear to be 
misguided.  
It is entirely possible that there is no single pre-condition or choice that solely affects the 
level of institutionalization of a party system. It appears as if PSI is a puzzle made up of many 
different pieces from path-dependent, sociological and cultural, and institutional factors alike. It is 
also possible that the true relationship between the level of party system institutionalization and its 
causes was hidden by the dependent variable index used in this study. Although it was created to give 
a more accurate and holistic reading of the level of PSI, it is possible that electoral volatility, the 
traditional measure of PSI, may provide more striking results. 
It is also worthy to note that some of both the high and low PSI cases appear to be outliers; 
they do not fit with any of the predictions. In the high PSI cases, for example, the Philippines has 
results for many independent variables that are not expected in a high PSI case. The opposite is true 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Matei 2008 
20 Encarnación, 2003  
21 Ibid, 2003 
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for Slovenia, a low PSI case that has many of the traits associated with high PSI . Further analysis 
into these individual cases may uncover different forces at play that contribute to their interesting 
outcomes. It might also be possible to produce more consistent results on a bivariate correlation or 
crosstabs on some of the hypothesized variables if those cases are removed.  
Many possibilities exist for future research and avenues to continue exploring the causes of 
party system institutionalization. Although mentioned in the literature review, personalistic voting 
was not tested for in this research.  A standardized measure may be tested to show that personalistic 
voting matters for PSI. Additionally, a study of the impact of a communist history may yield 
interesting results. Of the six post-communist states featured in this study, two are in the high PSI 
group compared to four with low PSI.  
These results contribute the discussion of party system institutionalization in new 
democracies in a different way. They point to some areas that require greater focus, while creating a 
framework to consider the factors of party system institutionalization. The strong correlation 
between the level of PSI and the presence of pacted transitions show that choices made by elites 
really do matter and have lasting consequences. Facilitating negotiations between elites that put in 
place future leaders and political players can help shape the future of a new democracy. Behavior 
during the critical moment of regime transition is critical to the success of a new democracy 
countless years down the road. The results from this research suggest that there is still much to be 
learned in the area of PSI in new democracies.  
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